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Abstract: In response to Anna Zyrkhova's contribution, this paper argues 
that we should not let a strong apophaticism govern our interpretation of 
Conciliar teachings on the doctrine of the Trinity. The paper distinguishes 
the material question of the divine nature and attributes - the kind of thing 
God is - from the formal question of the divine essence and persons as 
universal and particulars, as outlined by Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of 
Nyssa. Apophaticism on the first does not mandate apophaticism on the 
second, as the example of the Cappadocians goes to show. Basil himself 
seems to have advocated an approach to conciliar hermeneutics that is 
flexible rather than prescriptive. 
 




As Anna Zhyrkova rightly notes, conciliar statements—creeds, anathemas, canons, 
and the like— 
 
were not self–sufficient, and were never intended to count as an exposition of 
comprehensive teachings relating to any particular theological question. Rather, 
they were signs on the road being travelled by theologians engaged in seeking the 
best possible way to explicate the theological truths received in and through 
revelation. (2020, 182) 
 
As such, correctly construing conciliar statements ‘requires their key’: it requires 
the right interpretative tool. Zhyrkova finds such a key, in general terms, in the 
theological discussions that ‘led up to the particular formulations… promulgated 





Trinitarianism, ‘the ground rules concerning the very possibility of… speaking 
about God’. These ground rules were, in the case of the Trinitarian formulations of 
Constantinople I, those ‘laid down by Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nyssa’, 
according to which ‘the human intellect has no knowledge of God other than his 
existence’. And this knowledge, in turn, is derived from knowledge of ‘the actions 
and powers of God manifested through the creation’, ‘situated in the created 
realm, and thus differ[ing] ontologically from their source’. As Zhyrkova sees it, 
this strong apophaticism about the divine essence should be extended to the 
Councils’ Trinitarian locutions: 
 
Thus, if it is accepted that one may speak about the Divine as something above and 
beyond any created essence and substance, the same custom ought certainly to be 
adhered to where the Trinity is concerned as well: when engaging in Trinitarian 
discourse one should keep in mind that the Holy Trinity is itself something above 
and beyond substance. (2020, 197) 
 
Zhyrkova’s ambitious essay is wide ranging and richly textured. There is a great 
deal to be learned from it. Here I would like to focus on some of the ways in which 
it helped to come to a view on the matter that is at its heart, which is what we 
might call a ‘conciliar hermenuetics’: the principles one might or should use in 
interpreting the ‘terse formulations of the conciliar documents and decrees’. As a 
good scholastic, I will start with some distinctions that strike me as salient. The 
vast majority of Zhyrkova’s article is taken up with what we might think of as the 
material question of the divine essence and its relation to the divine attributes: 
‘material’ because it involves substantive claims about the kind of thing God is (or 
is not), claims that are of necessity unique to God. The conclusion of Zhyrkova’s 
discussion—relating these issues to the Trinity—concerns what we might think of 
as a formal question: ‘formal’ because, irrespective of the kind of thing something 
is, we can reasonably ask, with respect to that thing, about the relation of what is 
common—here, the divine substance—and what is not common—here, the divine 
persons. We can indeed ask this question about any case in which we confront 
different things of the same kind. The issue is not kind–specific or type–specific. 
That is not to say that the answers in every case would be the same; merely that 
questions of the common and the particular (to use Gregory of Nyssa’s terms in Ad 
Graecos) arise in intelligibly related ways across the divide between the created and 
the uncreated. And this is so even if we accept the strongly apophatic Cappadocian 
view on the material question just outlined. 
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Both kinds of issue, material and formal, can be given ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ accounts. 
For instance, I take it that the apophaticism advocated by Zhyrkova as the correct 
hermeneutical tool for understanding the Trinitarian decrees amounts to a 
relatively ‘thin’ understanding of the material question of God’s nature: we do not 
know that nature, but merely the created divine activities. It is knowledge of these 
activities that allows us to refer to God successfully. A ‘thick’ understanding of 
God’s nature might allow something more cataphatic than Zhyrkova 
countenances. Perhaps we can have knowledge of God’s (uncreated) attributes, 
and perhaps thereby knowledge God’s essence too, as ipsum esse subsistens. 
The same goes for the formal question. A thin account might treat of the 
distinction between person and nature as merely a linguistic matter, or (a bit 
thicker) as a merely logical matter. An example of the former, linguistic, approach, 
might be found in Augustine, at least as read by Bernard Lonergan: 
 
For Augustine, persona or substantia was an undefined, heuristic concept. He 
pointed out that Father, Son, and Spirit are three. He asked, Three what? He 
remarked that there are not three Gods, three Fathers, three Sons, three Spirits. He 
answered that there are three persons or substances, where ‘person’ or ‘substance’ 
just means what there are three of in the Trinity… Obviously, such an account of 
‘person’ does no more than indicate, so to speak, the area to be investigated. It 
directs future development but it cannot be said to impede it. The only manner in 
which it could become outworn would be the rejection of the Trinity; for as long as 
the Trinity is acknowledged, there are acknowledged three of something.1 
(Lonergan 1974, 25) 
 
But many theologians offer something far thicker and more robust than this. As 
Lonergan notes in the same passage, 
 
The original [i.e. Augustinian] heuristic structure, while it has remained, has not 
remained indeterminate. It has been developed in different ways at different times. 
There was the stage of definitions, indeed, of the three main definitions contributed 
by Boethius, Richard of St Victor, and Thomas Aquinas. There was the Trinitarian 
 
1 I do not say anything here about the correct interpretation of Augustine. For a different 
reading, see my “Quid tres? On What Precisely Augustine Professes Not to Understand in De 
Trinitate V and VII” (2007). Whether or not Lonergan’s reading is correct, the position he ascribes to 
Augustine is certainly a possible way of thinking about the theological question. For examples of 
the second approach, treating the question simply as a logical matter, see for instance Peter van 
Inwagen (1995); see too the attempt to demonstrate the syntactic consistency of a whole range of 





systematization that conceived the three persons as subsistent relations and based 
the relations upon psychologically conceived processions. If I may cite my own 
views, I have maintained… that the three Persons are the perfect community, not 
two in one flesh, but three subjects of a single, dynamic, existential consciousness. 
(Lonergan 1974, 25) 
 
Here, then, we have increasingly thick accounts of the formal question. But 
setting aside Lonergan’s rather western perspective presupposed in the passages 
just quoted, we might wonder where Gregory and Basil stand on this formal issue. 
Let me begin my noting Zhyrkova’s account of the matter: 
 
The Trinity… is not in actuality different from the Divinity, but rather identical 
with the latter—in spite of any differences with respect to the names for these or 
the meaning they convey. Thus if it has been accepted that one may speak about 
the Divine as something above and beyond any created essence and substance, 
then the same custom ought certainly to be adhered to where the Trinity is 
concerned… Someone holding that the notions construed by the human mind (e.g. 
substance, nature, hypostasis, or person) can be applied simply and directly to the 
Trinity… certainly adheres to the Eunomian heresy. 
 
At root, what Basil and Gregory objected to in Eunomius’s position was the claim 
that ‘ungenerated’ signifies the divine essence. Eunomius’s view ipso facto excludes 
the Son from the divinity. The response: ‘ungenerated’ does not signify the divine 
essence, but is simply a privative term that tells us ‘what God (the Father) is like’, 
not what God is (see Basil, Contra Eunomium, I, 15). Now, the thrust of this 
discussion focuses on the material question outlined above, not the formal one. 
And it is the formal one, not the material one, that is the subject of Constantinople 
I. 
Indeed, to turn to the question that I raised at the beginning of the previous 
paragraph, Basil and Gregory do indeed hold that notions such as ‘substance, 
nature, hypostasis, or person’ are directly and unproblematically applicable to the 
divine. This is perfectly consistent with their anti–Eunomian apophaticism on the 
material question, since the issues are quite distinct. In this context, Zhyrkova 
points to Gregory’s Letter 38, Ad Ablabium, and Ad Graecos—all texts in which 
Gregory treats the divine essence as a universal, shared by the three persons. 
Gregory does not treat the universal‒particular binary as a mere analogy or model. 
He thinks that creatures and God quite literally realize these notions in their unity 
and plurality. The difference, in Letter 38, is that the notions of Father, Son, and 
Spirit are mutually entailing in a way that the notions of particular instances of a 
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created kind are not; and, in Ad Ablabium, that the activities of the divine persons 
are necessarily inseparable in a way that the activities of particular instances of a 
created kind are not. But they all alike realize the notions of universal and 
particular. 
Zhyrkova argues eloquently that we should not take Gregory and Basil at their 
word here. But that seems to me to infer some kind of formal apophaticism from 
the Cappadocians’ material apophaticism. And making this inference, it seems to 
me, goes beyond what is warranted either in logic or in the Cappadocians’ texts. 
My point thus far is specific, not at all general. It is that if we were to look for a 
‘key’ to interpret the Trinitarian Councils, we should look not to the Cappadocians’ 
material apophaticism, but to their formal cataphaticism (in the senses of ‘material’ 
and ‘formal’ used above). But there is a more general question that arises from all 
of this: whether, and to what extent, we should look for a key to interpret the 
Trinitarian Councils, or, indeed, councils more generally. This hermeneutical 
question itself, like the material and formal questions I raised above, itself comes in 
thick and thin versions. Zhyrkova’s account of the ‘epistemological and logical 
premises of Conciliar Trinitarianism’ is an instance of a thick conciliar 
hermeneutics: we should be guided by the substantive theological positions of the 
principal thinkers involved in the council, or at least of those theologians clearly in 
the background of the council’s deliberations (recall that Basil died shortly before 
Constantinople I). An instance of a thin conciliar hermeneutics might be one that 
would take the fundamental purpose of a council to be the exclusion of error, and 
that would read the council without adverting too studiously to the established 
theological positions of its principals. 
One can of course combine these various approaches. For example, Zhyrkova 
adopts a thick conciliar hermeneutics and a thin account of both the formal and the 
material theological questions. Someone adopting a thin account of the formal 
question—perhaps treating the essence‒person distinction as simply a matter of 
rules governing linguistic usage—would be very likely to adopt a thin conciliar 
hermeneutics. The opposite association, however, need not hold: one could adopt a 
thin conciliar hermeneutics and yet a thick account of the formal question. 
Adopting a thin conciliar hermeneutics, after all, does not entail abandoning 
metaphysics. But it allows that, as a matter of history, a number of different 
technical theories have been developed to explicate the formal question of the 
distinction between universal and particular, for instance, even where what unites 
these theories is merely agreement about the problems to be explained (for 
example, in the case of universals, the common resemblance of items of the same 





Where do the Cappadocians stand on the hermeneutical question? Both the 
Creed of Constantinople I and the writings of Basil offer some highly illustrative 
paradigms that might enable us to hazard an answer. In reference to the clause of 
the Creed which reads ‘who with the Father and the Son is together worshipped 
and glorified’, the observations of J. N. D. Kelly, first made over seventy years ago, 
still seem germane: 
 
A feature of this article about the Spirit which is at first sight somewhat puzzling is 
the comparative mildness of its tone… The clause we are studying scrupulously 
avoids the term homoousios and contents itself, apart from the mention of the 
worship and honour due to the Spirit, with biblical phrases which, however 
unexceptionable if pressed, could be accepted by the Macedonians in their own 
sense… The aim of Theodosius in summoning the council was genuinely 
conciliatory, and he had insisted on including a quota of Macedonian bishops in 
his invitation… At the same time it must be remembered that not all in the 
orthodox ranks felt completely easy about the frank description of the Holy Spirit 
as God and as consubstantial with the Father and the Son which was becoming de 
rigueur… St Basil, in particular, practised a diplomatic caution which was 
sometime sharshly judged in more uncompromising circles, and even in the De 
Spiritu sancto, while in effect pleading for the doctrine of consubstantiality, had 
desisted from using the term. (Kelly 1950, 342–3) 
 
What is striking here is that both Basil’s writings and the Creed itself (though 
not, admittedly, other parts of the Council’s deliberations) prefer ecumenical 
pragmatism over theological nicety. Even if this does not provide irrefragable 
evidence in favour of a thin hermeneutics, it is nevertheless highly suggestive. This 
does not imply the attitude of someone likely to be particularly prescriptive about 
the interpretation of the Councils, or likely to see the need for a definitive 
exegetical key. Au contraire, it suggests the attitude of someone willing to tolerate a 
considerable degree of hermeneutical flexibility in the service of an eirenic 
ecumenism. 
If this reading of Basil is correct, he would adopt the following combination of 
views: thick formalism, thin materialism, and a thin conciliar hermeneutics. And 
now we can fruitfully contrast his view with that of Zhyrkova, whose position, if 
my analysis is right, would amount to thin formalism, thin materialism, and a 
thick conciliar hermeneutics. Appeals to tradition, then, as a guide to conciliar 
exegesis, are perhaps more complex than they may at first sight appear. 
 
 





Cross, Richard. 2007. “Quid tres? On What Precisely Augustine Professes Not to 
Understand in De Trinitate V and VII.” Harvard Theological Review 100: 215–32. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0017816007001551.  
Inwagen, Peter van. 1995. “And Yet They Are Not Three Gods But One God.” In 
Peter van Inwagen, God, Knowledge, and Mystery: Essays in Philosophical Theology. 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Kelly, J. N. D.  1950. Early Christian Creeds. London, New York, Toronto: 
Longmans, Green and Co. 
Lonergan, Bernard. 1974. A Second Collection. Edited by William F. J. Ryan and 
Bernard J. Tyrrell. London: Darton, Longman and Todd. 
Thom, Paul. 2012. The Logic of the Trinity: Augustine to Ockham. Medieval 
Philosophy: Texts and Studies. New York, NY: Fordham University Press. 
https://doi.org/10.5422/fordham/9780823234769.001.0001.  
Zhyrkova, Anna. 2020. “Can We Predicate of and Speak about God, and What Are 
the Rules for Doing So? On the Epistemological and Logical Premises of 
Conciliar Trinitarianism.” TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of 
Religion and Philosophical Theology 4, 2: 181–201 
https://doi.org/10.14428/thl.v4i2.52753.  
 
